Abstract. Three attacks on the DES with a reduced number of rounds in the Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) are studied, namely a meet in the middle attack, a di erential attack, and a linear attack. These attacks are based on the same principles as the corresponding attacks on the ECB mode. They are compared to the three basic attacks on the CFB mode, namely an exhaustive key search, a comparison attack, and a tabulation attack. In 8-bit CFB and with 8 rounds in stead of 16, a di erential attack with 2 39:4 chosen ciphertexts can nd 3 key bits, and a linear attack with 2 31 known plaintexts can nd 7 key bits. This suggests that it is not safe to reduce the number of rounds in order to improve the performance. Moreover, it is shown that the nal permutation has some cryptographic signi cance in the CFB mode.
Introduction
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) was developed in the seventies at IBM (together with NSA) and was published by the National Bureau of Standards in 1977 9] . Its intended application was sensitive but unclassi ed data. In spite of the initial controversy, it became the most widespread cryptographic algorithm. Four modes of use of the DES have been speci ed in national and international standards 10, 12, 13]: Electronic Code Book (ECB), Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB) and Output Feedback (OFB). The DES has been the subject of several studies. One of the rst properties that was discovered was the complementation property 11]; it can be exploited to halve the number of operations for an exhaustive key search. Other interesting properties have been identi ed in 8]. Attacks have been described in 6, 7] , but the most successful techniques are di erential cryptanalysis introduced by E. Biham and A. Shamir 3] and linear cryptanalysis invented by M. Matsui 15] . The rst attack which is faster than exhaustive key search was the di erential attack of 5] . Most attacks on the DES are applicable to the ECB mode, and some can be extended to the CBC mode 4]. Only one attack was published on the OFB mode 14]: it was shown by R. Jueneman that the size of the feedback variable should be 64 bits. For the time being no evaluation of the DES in the CFB mode has been published 16] .
In this volume, K. Ohta and M. Matsui describe a di erential attack which is applicable to the m-bit CFB mode for`large' values of m (m 24). This paper presents attacks that are also applicable for smaller values of m.
In the rst part of this paper the CFB mode is described. In Sect. 3 three basic attacks are discussed that depend only on the size of the parameters of the algorithm; they can serve as a point of reference. Section 4 shows how a meet in the middle attack can be applied in the CFB mode. In Sect. 5 the main result is discussed, namely the extension of di erential cryptanalysis to the CFB mode. Section 6 discussed the applicability of linear attacks. Finally the conclusions are presented.
The CFB mode
This section discusses the CFB mode for a block cipher with a block length of 64 bits like the DES. The CFB mode is a stream mode, i.e., the size m of the plaintext blocks can be arbitrarily chosen between 1 and 64 bits. The scheme that is described here is a simpli ed version of the more general scheme contained in the standards.
The CFB mode makes use of an internal 64-bit register. The state of this register before the encryption or decryption of the ith block is denoted with X i . First this register is initialized with the starting variable or X 1 = SV . The plaintext and ciphertext blocks are denoted with P i and C i respectively, and the encryption operation with the secret key K is denoted with E K ().
The encryption of plaintext block i consists of the following two steps:
Here k denotes concatenation, rchop t denotes the function that drops the t rightmost bits of its argument, and lchop t denotes the function that drops the t leftmost bits of its argument. The decryption operates in a similar way.
The most important property of the CFB mode is that if m is chosen equal to the character size, this mode is self synchronizing. This means that if one or more m-bit characters between sender and receiver are lost, automatic resynchronization occurs after 64 bits. This is especially important in a communication environment, where m is typically equal to 1 or 8 bits. The price paid for this property is that the performance decreases with a factor 64=m. In contrast with the OFB mode, a single bit error is propagated with a factor 64.
In the case of m-bit CFB, a known plaintext and a chosen plaintext attack are equivalent: in both cases the cryptanalyst has no control over the input of the block cipher. The most powerful attack in the CFB mode is a chosen ciphertext attack, which corresponds to a chosen plaintext attack in ECB mode, with the di erence that the cryptanalyst can only observe m output bits. In OFB mode, the number of observable bits is also limited to m, but the most powerful attack is a known plaintext attack.
Three basic attacks
The simplest attack is clearly an exhaustive search for the key; it is a known plaintext attack. Exploitation of the complementation property requires a chosen ciphertext attack, or more precisely, a su cient number of pairs of the form (C i ; P i ); (C i ; P 0 i ). Even in 1976 there was a debate over the feasibility of an exhaustive search for a 56-bit DES key. It is clear that this attack is becoming more and more realistic. For more details the reader is referred to 18]. The exhaustive attack is only discussed as a reference for other attacks.
Two results will be presented. The rst result is an expression for the number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs to determine the key uniquely. 
From this proposition it follows that in order to determine the key uniquely M has to be slightly larger than k=m. A second result is applicable to the DES with a reduced number of rounds. The DES has 16 rounds; the number of rounds for the reduced version of the DES will be denoted with N. Table 1 indicates how many key bits in uence the ciphertext in the case of m-bit CFB with N rounds. It is clear that this depends on the selection of the bits. The standards specify that the leftmost m bits are selected. For the DES, this selection is in uenced by IP ?1 . In 1-bit CFB, the output bit is independent from the operations (and the subkey) in the last round, and for larger values of m the output bits are selected from di erent S-boxes. It will be shown in Sect. 5 and 6 that di erential and linear attacks are very sensitive to these positions. It is remarkable that IP ?1 has a cryptographic meaning in this context. IP and IP ?1 were probably introduced to facilitate hardware implementations, and it is easily seen that in ECB and CBC mode they have no security implication (except for the case where the plaintext has a special structure 3]).
A second attack that is relevant is a comparison attack 16]: the cryptanalyst searches for M-bit matches between the ciphertext bits. If a match occurs, he knows that the output of the block cipher will be equal in both cases, and hence he knows the exor of two plaintext bits. Note that the position of these plaintext bits can not be selected. Because of the birthday paradox, such a match will occur after about 2 M=2+1 ciphertext bits. If M = 64, and the encryption speed is equal to 2 Mbit/s, the storage requirements are 1 Gigabyte, and it will take about 1:16 hour to nd a single match. If one waits for 25 days, one can collect 512 Gigabyte, and one expects about 2 19 matches. This attack can be thwarted by increasing the frequency of the key change. If more than 2 42 bits are collected, even triple matches will occur.
A third attack is the tabulation attack, which depends only on the size of the input register (and not on the size of the key or the number of rounds). The cryptanalyst will use a huge amount of known plaintexts to build a table of the secret mapping f. After about 2 M ln(2 M ) encryptions of arbitrary plaintexts with the unknown key, the secret mapping is completely known. An important di erence between this type of attack and the simple exhaustive key search attack is that in this case it is not possible to perform the computations in parallel.
A meet in the middle attack
One of the rst attacks on the DES with a reduced number of rounds in ECB mode was the meet in the middle attack proposed by D. Chaum and J.-H. Evertse 6] . The attack is faster than exhaustive search for N 6. The basic idea is to look for r data bits in a middle round that depend on a limited number s of key bits. First an exhaustive search is performed for these bits, and subsequently the remaining key bits are determined.
In the case of the CFB mode, the probability that a key can be eliminated is signi cantly smaller, as only a small part of the ciphertext is known. If N = 3 and m = 1, one can show that the optimal choice is r = 4 bits in the middle (namely bits 18, 19, 20, and 21 of the right half of the register in the second round). In this case the subkey has s = 27 bits. The probability that a bad subkey survives in one trial is not equal to 1=2 r as for the ECB mode, but h=2 r , where h is a constant that has to be determined with a computer program (yielding h = 0:5). If it is assumed that the probability of survival for di erent plaintext/ciphertext pairs is independent, one can determine the expected number of remaining keys encryptions, where k denotes the total number of key bits that in uences the output (in this case one nds in Table 1 that k = 39). If M = 256, the number of operations in the second step is small compared to the rst step. The total number of encryptions is a factor 2 7 smaller than for exhaustive search, but about 5 times more plaintext/ciphertext pairs are necessary.
For larger values of m, more ciphertext bits are known, but more key bits come into play as well. If m = 8, one can extend the previous approach in a straightforward way. One can however also try to reduce the number of required plaintext/ciphertext pairs by looking to bits 3 and 5 of the output (hence r = 2). These bits only depend on s = 37 key bits. The rst term corresponds to 2 36 3-round DES encryptions, and the second term is equal to 2 32 if M = 12. This means that this is a factor 2 20 faster than exhaustive search. A comparable improvement was obtained in 6] for N = 4 in ECB mode. These results can be extended partially to 4 or 5 rounds, but the attack becomes more complicated: one can not simply go backwards, because one has to guess some key bits and part of the ciphertext bits. Note that in ECB mode the improvement for 6 rounds is limited to a factor 4. As these attacks are known plaintext attacks, they are also applicable to m-bit OFB.
A di erential attack
First it will be explained why a di erential attack cannot be applied directly to the CFB mode. Subsequently the required modi cations will be discussed, and an attack on 4, 5, and more rounds will be presented. Finally some extensions will be discussed, and several modi cations to enhance the security of the DES in the CFB mode will be proposed.
Why does the conventional di erential approach not work?
A di erential attack in ECB mode is based on the following principle. The actual values of the input bits of the last round are known (because they are the right half of the ciphertext before IP ?1 ). The output exor of the last round is known with a certain probability (if the input pair is a right pair, the exor can be predicted). Subsequently the exor table and some additional information on the S-boxes allow to determine part of the subkey of the last round.
In the CFB mode only part of the output is known, as indicated in Table 2 . It should be remarked that the information on the outputs is restricted to exor information.It is clear that a di erential attack requires that information on both input and output bits of a single S-box is available. This means that in 1-bit CFB this approach is restricted to the trivial case of 2 rounds. If 3 rounds or more are used, it follows from Table 2 that m has to be at least 3. In the following the di erential attack will be described for 8-bit CFB. In this case most information is available on S-box 3, namely 1 input bit and 2 output bits. A reduced exor table can be produced for the bits that are known by adding columns and rows of the original exor table. One could hope to determine information on key bit K 44 that is exored with input bit a of S3. However, it is easy to show that in this situation the output bits will not suggest a particular value for this single key bit (i.e., all values in the reduced exor table are equal). Table 2 
An extended di erential attack
The di erential attack can be extended to the CFB mode if one also uses the characteristic to predict the input exor of the last round (at least partially). This implies that the reduced exor table is obtained by adding only the columns of the original exor table.
A second property which can be exploited is that if an input bit exor of an S-box equals 0, the output exor reveals some information on the corresponding key bit. Denote the pair of intermediate ciphertext bits a of S3 with (c; c 0 ); the cryptanalyst knows both bits. The corresponding key bit is K 44 . The unknown input bits to the S-box are (c K i ; c 0 K i ). If c = c 0 , or c c 0 = 0, these input bits will be equal to (0; 0) if K i = c = c 0 and will be equal to (1; 1) otherwise. One can now divide the reduced exor table into two parts, and distinguish between these two cases. This will reveal some information on key bit K 44 . If c 6 = c 0 , no information can be obtained on K 44 . Indeed, the input bits to the S-box will be di erent, and the key bit K 44 only determines whether they are equal to (0; 1) or (1; 0). Information on the key bits can be obtained as follows. The probability that the corresponding key bit K 44 is equal to 1 can be determined from the observed output exor by applying Bayes' rule 1 . For a right pair, one obtains that . It is clear that Pr(K 44 = 1) = 1=2. Both input and output exor are only known with a certain probability. The probability that the input exor is correct is slightly larger, and it is clear that both probabilities are not independent.
The next problem is how to combine the outcome of M pairs in an e cient way. Assume that it follows from pair j that the probability that K 44 = 1 is equal to q j . Then one de nes (4) It can be shown that this corresponds to a repeated application of Bayes' rule. If Q M > 0:5, one decides that K 44 = 1. In practice one expects that, after a su cient number of experiments, Q M will form a reliable estimate for K 44 and will be close to 1 (or 0) with high probability.
An important issue is the choice of the characteristic in order to maximize jq ? 0:5j. This depends on the probability p of the characteristic, the possibility of ltering, and on the di erence between the 0 ? 0 and 1 ? 1 entries in the reduced exor table. Let q i denote the value of q corresponding to a given input and output exor (the same numbering is used as for the values e i in Table 4 ). One can now prove the following proposition (the proof will be given in the full paper):
Proposition 2 The number M 0 of right pairs required to predict a key bit with a probability of error equal to 1 Here i indexes the 4 columns corresponding to the 4 possible output exors S 0 O . This measure is indicated in Table 3 .
An attack on 4 rounds
It follows from the previous section that the value of S3 0 E = 01 x in the last round is optimal.The input exor to the rst round is equal to (40 08 00 00 x ; 04 00 00 00 x ). Then the characteristic has a probability of 1=4 in the rst round. In the third round, it is su cient that the input exor to S3 is correct. If the pairs with output exor 00xx for S3 are ltered, only a fraction of 2 64 of the right pairs is lost. From this it follows that the fractionp of right pairs after ltering is equal to 
This assumes that the wrong pairs yield a uniform distribution of output exors, which has been con rmed by computer experiments. For S3 0 E = 01 x andp = 0:39 one obtains for q = 0:609, 0:527, and 0:383 for S3 0 O = 01xx, 10xx, and 11xx respectively.
For an error probability of 5% (or z = 0:95), Proposition 2 predicts that M 0 = 16:6 and M = M 0 =p = 89, which has been con rmed by computer simulations. A similar attack can be applied to determine a key bit entering S-boxes 5 and 7; it will only be discussed for a larger number of rounds.
If m = 8, a di erential attack allows to determine 3 key bits (namely one bit corresponding to S3, S5 and S7), and if m = 16 this increases to 6 key bits. Even in that case the maximal number of output bits of a single S-box is equal to 2.
An attack on 5 rounds
In order to develop an attack that is extendible to more rounds, an iterative characteristic will be used; this characteristic is probably not optimal for the 5 round case. For derivation of the key bit corresponding to S3, an input exor of 01 x is again the best choice. This implies that in the one but last round S2 has to receive a non-zero input exor. For the iterative characteristic 3] (input exor of left halve equals 1B 60 00 00 x ), the probability in this round is equal to 55 128 , while for (input exor of left halve equals 19 60 00 00 x ), this probability is equal to 33 128 . This implies that is preferable ( might be used in a quartet structure).
The pairs for which the output exors of bit 1 or 7 are not equal to zero will be ltered; the same holds for the pairs for which the output exor of S3 is equal to 00xx. It is assumed that pairs that do not follow the characteristic in the second round give a uniformly distributed output. For pairs that do not follow the characteristic in round 4, one can lter all those that do not follow the characteristic in S2, and 18 64 of the pairs that do not follow the characteristic in S1. This yields the following fraction of right pairs among the ltered ones: For an error probability of 5% (or z = 0:95), Proposition 2 predicts that 370; 000 pairs are su cient to obtain a key bit (only 1 characteristic has been used).
Computer simulations show that the actual number of pairs is even smaller. For S-boxes 6 and 7, a similar strategy can be followed. The best iterative characteristic for both S-boxes has input exor 00 00 1D 40 x for the left halve. In the one but last round this characteristic has probability 7 16 for S5 and 63 256 for S7 to yield an input exor of 04 x respectively 01 x . The fraction of right pairs after ltering is equal to 5:92 10 ?3 and 3:33 10 ?3 , from which one can estimate that the number of required pairs is equal to 12 and 8:4 million. In both cases one can eliminate those pairs for which the exor of bits 3 and 5 is not equal to 0.
Six rounds and more
The same characteristics can be used as in the previous section. In order to optimize that attack one can use the ideas of 5] to get around the rst round. The problem here is that the ltering of wrong pairs will be less e ective. The estimated number of pairs to nd 1 and 3 key bits for 8-bit CFB are indicated in Table 5 .
The attack for N = 7 (without the optimization to gain an additional round) was implemented as a distributed application on a heterogeneous, non-dedicated farm of 30 DEC workstations, using the PVM (Parallel Virtual Machine) software 1] for interprocess communication. The program was generated and run from the HeNCE (Heterogeneous Network Computer Environment) software 2]. The correct key bits were retrieved from 2 35:2 pairs using a quartet structure; the attack took about 40 hours. 
Extensions
If the number m of feedback bits increases, more key bits can be found (5 if m 15). If m 18 three output bits of a single S-box are known, which implies that a smaller reduction has to be applied to the exor tables, resulting in a reduction of the required number of chosen ciphertext pairs. If m 15, two bits of S8 in the last round are known, and the input to the one but last round can be estimated. Only if m 28 one obtains in this way information on both input and output of a single S-box, which allows to determine key bits in this round. This di erential attack would be impossible without IP ?1 . In the absence of IP ?1 only information on the output of S-boxes of the last round would be available. The security of the DES in 1-bit CFB could be improved if the bit is selected from the left half of the ciphertext. Selecting all the CFB bits from the left half of the ciphertext thwarts the proposed di erential attacks for small values of m. Another way to strengthen the DES in the CFB mode against di erential attacks could be a redesign of the S-boxes in the last round in order to decrease the di erence between the 0?0 and 1?1 entries in the reduced exor table. Finally a completely di erent structure for the computation of the CFB bits from the inputs to the last round could be used. 
Conclusions and open problems
Several attacks on the DES in the ECB mode can be extended to the m-bit CFB mode. They are only faster than exhaustive key search if the number of rounds is reduced. A meet in the middle attack on the DES with 3 rounds yields an improvement with a factor 2 20 over exhaustive search in case of 8-bit CFB or OFB mode. A modi ed di erential attack has been presented that works in mbit CFB with m 3. The most important modi cations are that the exor of the input to the S-boxes of the last round are determined based on the characteristic and that the exor table is reduced. Moreover additional information on actual input values is taken into account. The attack is 8 times faster than exhaustive search for 9 rounds or less and 2 times faster for 10 rounds. A linear attack for m 6 is shown. When the DES is reduced to 8 rounds, it needs 2 31 texts to determine 7 key bits .
These attacks are completely theoretical in the sense that they o er no threat for the DES with 16 rounds in the m-bit CFB mode (for`small' m). However, they are of some interest because for small values of m the m-bit CFB mode is very slow: this is an argument to reduce the number of rounds in order to obtain an acceptable performance. An interesting result is that the DES with 8 rounds in 8-bit CFB mode is less secure against these attacks than the DES with 16 rounds in ECB mode, while the rst scheme is 4 times slower. It has been shown that in the CFB mode (and the OFB mode) IP ?1 has a cryptographic meaning.
It would be interesting to investigate further the applicability of linear cryptanalysis and to extend all these attacks to other iterated block ciphers like IDEA and LOKI91. One of the important di erences will be that the known bits are concentrated in a few S-boxes.
